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I. Introduction

What follows is an effort to focus attention on certain
problem areas in the day-to-day administration of justice.
They are problems not so much because of their complexity,
but rather because uncertainty persists despite considerable
discussion of the rules governing each area. I have selected
preliminary hearings, bail, appointment of counsel, sua sponte
judicial dismissals, and reasonable doubt as appropriate topics
for this chapter. There are, of course, numerous others entitled to treatment, but each of those selected relates to a subject over which the trial judge may exercise an extremely broad
discretion. The exercise of this discretion may alter the course
of a criminal proceeding, and once exercised, is often beyond
the reach of an appellate court.
Since the exercise of discretion seems to infuriate those who
would attribute worsening crime statistics to judicial leniency,
it must be noted at the outset that the entire system, from the
beat-patrolman through the prosecutor's office and on to the
governor's pardoning power, is replete with discretion. This
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/21
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is by design and merely signifies that no system of justice is infallible. That is not to say that, in some instances, discretion
is not exercised arbitrarily. Many of these are correctable
at the reviewing court level. To the extent that they are not,
the value of reposing discretion in our executive and judicial
officers charged wtih the responsibility of enforcing criminal
laws exceeds the harm done by a bad decision.
In actuality, the discretion exercised by the courts pales into
insignificance when compared with the discretion exercised
by police officers in the field, who, for one reason or another,
often despite probable cause, will decline to make an arrest,
or that exercised by prosecutors, who, upon evaluating a police
report, will decide that the evidence is insufficient to justify
a prosecution and will decline to file a complaint. The difference lies in the accessibility of these discretionary decisions to
the public view. The judge's statements are recorded by a
court reporter and are frequently observed by the press. Except for those rare cases attracting public attention, little is
known and less is said about the manner in which the police
and district attorney carry out their responsibilities on a caseto-case or incident-to-incident basis.
The fact that a prosecutor's office has an 85 percent conviction rate is not an accurate measure of its effectiveness, since
evaluation procedures have sifted out many of the tougher
cases. Consequently, complaints are filed in those cases in
which conviction is the foreseeable result. Even then, should
further analysis suggest that the chances of conviction are less
than first anticipated, the way is open to recommend a lesser
plea or move for dismissal. Thus, conviction rates remain intact despite rising crime statistics. Crime clearance rates collected by local police departments may be just as misleading.
This unreliability springs from the manner in which the
original statistic is arrived at and the criteria for declaring a
crime solved.
In short, it is naive to assume that a system providing for as
much discretion as ours can expect to dispense "equal justice under law." Approximate justice, perhaps, but never
equal. The disparate results are sometimes shocking to bePublished by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
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hold, although our reviewing courts and, particularly, the Supreme Courts of California and the United States have insisted
on the imposition of minimum constitutional standards, thereby assuring relatively equivalent treatment. In recent years,
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the Bill of Rights
have been made applicable to the states, thereby closing a gap
that had created some horrifying differences in the kind of due
process a citizen of the United States could expect, depending
on his geographical location at the time he was charged with
a crime.
The discussion that follows is not intended to imply that
"equal justice under law" is an unworthy goal, or that judicial
discretion in any of the areas referred to should be curtailed.
The better conclusion is that a judge's failure to exercise discretion in an appropriate case undermines the independence
of the judiciary and weakens the sinew of a free society by
relinquishing judicial power to the executive. Concededly,
judicial discretion must be exercised wisely and cautiously,
keeping in mind that both protection of the community and
justice for the individual are legitimate goals that provide
an ethical basis for the administration of justice in a democracy.
II. Appointment of Counsel
A. Objections to Appointment of Counsel

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/21

Infrequently-but on occasion-a district attorney will
object to the appointment of a public defender to represent a
purportedly indigent accused. The danger of proceeding with
a pro per defendant who has requested counsel is manifest,
and the legal pitfalls are so numerous that the objection is
a curious one. The prosecutor should be concerned with insulating a potential conviction from any constitutional defect,
but his objection to court-appointed counsel has the opposite
effect. Moreover, the district attorney's standing to raise such
an objection is doubtful, although he clearly has the right to
present any information that is pertinent to a determination
of indigency.
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Government Code Section 27706 (a), provides that". . .
[u ]pon request of the defendant [or] upon order of court
[the public defender] shall defend, without expense to the defendant, any person who is not financially able to employ
." A defendant may apply to the court, the
counsel.
public defender, or both for such services, and a determination
by one that the defendant is ineligible is 'not binding on the
other. Furthermore, a determination of eligibility by one is
not reversible by the other.l Accordingly, the public defender
is in a position to supersede a trial judge on this question,
providing he does so in favor of representation.
Intervention of the trial judge into an attorney-client relationship is so unpalatable to the California Supreme Court
that it would seem to follow that a district attorney's interference would be considered even more undesirable. The nature
of the attorney-client relationship is such that "once counsel
is appointed or undertakes to represent an indigent defendant, whether it be the public defender or a volunteer private
attorney, the parties enter into an attorney-client relationship
which is no less inviolable than if counsel had been retained.
To hold otherwise would be to subject that relationship to
an unwarranted and invidious discrimination arising merely
from the poverty of the accused."2
B. Determination of Indigency

There is no precise formula for determining the financial
eligiblity of a defendant for court-appointed counsel, and the
California Supreme Court has recognized that a reviewing
court should not prescribe a specific maximum amount of net
liquid assets as a cutoff point. The appropriate test is "whether or not a private attorney would be interested in representing
the defendant in his present economic circumstances."3 A

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970

1. Ingram v. Justice Court, 69 Cal.2d
832, 73 Cal. Rptr. 410, 447 P.2d 650
(1968).
2. Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.2d
547, 562, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10, 440 P.2d
65, 74 (1968); People v. Ferry, 237 Cal.
App.2d 880, 890, 47 Cal. Rptr. 324,
CAL LAW 1970

332 (1965); Ingram v. Justice Court, 69
Ca1.2d832, 840-841,73 Cal. Rptr. 410,
414-415, 447 P.2d 650, 654, 655 (1968).
3. In re Smiley, 66 Cal.2d 606, 620,
58 Cal. Rptr. 579, 587, 427 P.2d 179,
187 (1967), citing 13 Stanford L. Rev.
522.
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determination of indigency is based on the defendant's over-all
financial situation. Indebtedness must be weighed against
assets, and the complexity of the case as well as the cost of
legal representation in the community must be considered.
In In re Smiley, the Court recognized that the inquiry of trial
judges will normally "be a cursory one," and that as a practical
matter, judges will be required to accept the defendant's own
evaluation of his ability to retain private counse1. Should a
judge's ambivalence on the subject lead to a hearing, a failure
to consider outstanding indebtedness such as encumbrances
on the home and automobile, number and age of defendants,
child support and alimony, etc., would be error.4 Since contingent fees are unethical, and few attorneys will accept employment on a credit basis in a criminal case, the ability of
an accused to post bail or to resume his employment is not
determinative of eligibility for court-appointed counse1.'
C. Discharge of Appointed Counsel by Court
Determinations of indigency aside, it is beyond the inherent
power of a trial court to interfere with the attorney-client
relationship by discharging a defendant's court-appointed
counsel of record, over the attorney's and defendant's objections, on the ground of the judge's subjective opinion that the
attorney is incompetent. Although a defendant has a constitutional right to the effective aid of counsel, the trial court
must neither infringe on the defendant's right to counsel of
his choice nor compromise the independence of the Bar. The
admission of an attorney to the Bar establishes his competence
to practice in all state courtS. 6 While the California Supreme
Court acknowledges situations in which the trial judge could
act sua sponte, such as illness, intoxication, or a nervous breakdown, such action "should be taken with great circumspection

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/21

4. In re Smiley, 66 Cal.2d 606, 619,
58 Cal. Rptr. 579, 587, 427 P.2d 179,
187.
S. People v. Ferry, 237 Cal. App. 2d
880, 47 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1965); Williams
v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. App. 2d
614
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13 Stanford L. Rev. 522.
6. Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.
2d 547, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 65
(1968).
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and only after all reasonable alternatives such as the granting
of a continuance have been exhausted."7
The supervening consideration in all such cases is "the
State's duty to refrain from unreasonable interference with the
individual's desire to defend himself in whatever manner he
deems best, using every legitimate resource at his command."8
"Incompetence," the Court holds, is not a legitimate basis for
a trial judge to, on his own motion, relieve counsel, and "the
recognition of such an authority would involve the surrender
of a substantial amount of the independence of the Bar and
in many instances would deprive litigants of a fair hearing."9

D. Waiver of Counsel
Extreme caution must be exercised in accepting a waiver
of counsel from a defendant. As the above discussion would
indicate, the trial judge has an obligation to determine whether
indigency is the catalyst for the purported waiver. If so, the
trial court must appoint counsel. The trial court's obligation
exists even if the defendant is an attorney; the rights of individuals are not to be gauged by their professions or occupations.lO
Doubts with respect to the right of a defendant to court-appointed counsel in all misdemeanor cases (including traffic
offenses denominated misdemeanor) were set aside in the cases
of In re Johnson ll and Blake v. Municipal Court. 12 Article I,
Section 13 of the California Constitution provides that in a
criminal prosecution in any court whatsoever, defendants are
guaranteed the right to counsel. In Johnson, the California
Supreme Court emphasized that in determining whether a
7. Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.
2d 547, 559, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9, 440 P.
2d 65, 72-73.
8. Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.
2d 547, 559, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9, 440
P.2d 65, 73, quoting from People v.
Crovedi, 65 Cal.2d 199, 206, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 284, 289, 417 P.2d 868, 873.
9. Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.
2d 547, 562, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 11, 440
CAL LAW 1970
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P.2d 65, 75 (1968), quoting Gallagher v.
Municipal Court, 31 Cal.2d 784, 797,
192 P.2d 905, 914 (1948).
10. Bogart v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.
2d 436, 34 Cal. Rptr. 850, 386 P.2d
474 (1963).
11. 62 Cal.2d 325, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228,
398 P.2d 420 (1965).
12. 242 Cal. App. 2d 731, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 771 (1966).
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defendant has effectively waived his right to an attorney, the
usual presumptions against waiver of a constitutional right
apply. The record must reflect an express and personal waiver by the defendant demonstrating his full knowledge and
recognition of the significance of his acts. Whether a trial
judge permits a defendant to waive counsel is discretionary.
but the trial court must perform its duty in a manner calculated
"to promote rather than defeat the constitutional intent."13
A determination of whether to accept a waiver hinges on
the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant, and his
understanding of the nature and effect of the waiver, the
charge against him, and the pleas and defenses that may be
available to him as well as the punishment that may be exacted. 14
The Johnson opinion by Justice Mosk does not ignore the
actuality of mass arraignments, such as in traffic court, where
individually advising each defendant of his constitutional
rights would hopelessly ensnarl the court calendar, but states
that "although there may be a choice of valid ways to implement these rights," there can be no impairment thereof, however minor the crime. 15 The clear conclusion to be drawn
from the Johnson and Smiley cases is that, on appeal, reviewing courts are apt to be result-oriented and will scrupulously
examine purported waivers of constitutional rights whenever
the defendant has been sentenced to a period of confinement,
however short.
This is borne out by the reasoning of Blake v. Municipal
Court, wherein the defendant was convicted of violating Section 22350 of the Vehicle Code for operating a vehicle at 53
miles per hour in a 25-mile zone. A group of defendants,
including Blake, had been advised collectively of their rights,
including the right to court-appointed counsel if indigent.
Blake pleaded guilty and was sentenced to one day in the
13. 62 Cal.2d 325, 330, 42 Cal. Rptr.
228, 231, 398 P.2d 420, 423 (1965).
14. In re Johnson, 62 Cal.2d 325, 42
Cal. Rptr. 228, 398 P.2d 420.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/21
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county jail. Holding the waiver ineffective, the Court of
Appeals emphasized that where the assistance of counsel is a
constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does
not depend on a request. Accordingly, neither the defendant's failure to make a request nor his entry of a guilty plea
was determinative of waiver. Where a loss of liberty results
from conviction, even for a a misdemeanor traffic offense, the
record must affirmatively show that the defendant was notified
of the right to counsel and that he expressly waived that right.
A petition for hearing was subsequently denied by the California Supreme Coure s
E. The Right to Self-Representation
"A defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to
waive counsel and represent himself if he knowingly and
intelligently elects to do so. ,,17 The determination of whether
a defendant is competent to represent himself is discretionary
and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse
of discretion. IS Although the defendant's right to represent
himself may not be denied on the sole basis that he is unable
to "demonstrate either the acumen or the learning of a skilled
lawyer," he must have a meaningful understanding of the
nature of the offense charged against him, available pleas and
defenses, potential punishments, and the consequences of a
waiver.
In the final analysis, a reading of the cases compels the conclusion that it is unwise for a trial judge, except in the case
of an unusually intelligent and articulate defendant, to permit
an accused charged with a serious crime to represent himself.
As the California Supreme Court said in People v. Floyd,
"Had the defendant like Milton . . . represented himself
in a death penalty case, this court would have been required
16. 242 Cal. App. 2d 731, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 771 (1966).
17. People v. Floyd, 1 Ca1.3d 694,
702, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 612, 464 P.2d
64, 68 (1970); People v Redmond, 71
Cal.2d - , - , 79 Cal. Rptr. 529, 536,
CAL LAW 1970
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457 P.2d 321, 328 (1969); People v.
Maddox, 67 Cal.2d 647, 651, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 371, 374,433 P.2d 163, 166.
18. 1 Cal.3d 694, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608,
464 P.2d 64 (1970).
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to reverse any conviction resulting from those proceedings,
based on a fundamental denial of due process.,,19
A trial judge having concluded that a defendant is competent to appear in propria persona should not hesitate to
reverse himself if, after observing the defendant in action, he
becomes convinced that his original judgment was wrong.
Not only would the continuation of the proceedings under such
circumstances result in a denial of due process, but it would
be disruptive of the judicial process. The California Supreme
Court has stated that "the right to counsel may not be used
to subvert the orderly and efficient administration of justice
and that its utilization as a tool for dilatory purposes may not
be permitted. It is equally true that the right to represent oneself may not be used for such purposes.,,20
Thus, a defendant has a right to represent himself subject to
the trial court's constant duty to protect the judicial process
from subversion, and the trial court possesses broad discretion
not only in relation to the appointment of counsel to supersede
the defendant in the conduct of his defense but also for advisory or other limited purposes. "The right of an accused
to represent himself with or without the assistance of counsel
is not so absolute that it must be recognized when to do so
would disrupt the business of the court or jeopardize a fair
trial of the issues."l
The reviewing courts view the intervention of a trial court in
a self-representation situation differently from interference of
the trial court in an existing attorney-client relationship. In
the former situation, a determination of the defendant's competence requires an assessment of his ability to conduct his
own defense; in the latter, the attorney's competence is presumed by virtue of the fact he is licensed to practice in the
State of California.
If a defendant is deemed competent to represent himself,

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/21

19. 1 Ca1.3d 694, 704,83 Cal. Rptr.
608, 613, 464 P.2d 64, 69.
20. People v. Powers, 256 Cal. App.
2d 904, 914, 64 Cal. Rptr. 450, 457
(1967).
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(1965).
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he accepts the responsibilities "inherent in the role which he
has undertaken," and a judge is not required to assist or advise
the defendant on matters of law, evidence, or trial practice. a
Nevertheless, in People v. Redmond, the California Supreme Court strongly urges trial judges to assist persons appearing in pro per:
The primary goal of the effective administration of justice in this country is to assure that legal controversies are
determined on the merits, and this goal is not furthered
if a determination is based, not on the merits, but on the
inabilities of a litigant, untrained in the law, who has
chosen, perhaps unwisely, to represent himself and who
is not fully conversant with legal procedures. It is in the
highest tradition of American jurisprudence for the trial
judge to assist a person who represents himself as to the
presentation of evidence, the rules of substantive law, and
legal procedure, and judges who undertake to assist, in
order to assure that there is no miscarriage of justice due
to litigants' shortcomings in representing themselves are
to be highly commended. s
The California Supreme Court ac~nowledges that, while endeavoring to assist a defendant, there may be cases in which
a trial judge, acting in good faith, will give erroneous or misleading advice. Such pitfalls are outweighed by the benefits
to the administration of justice derived from assisting pro per
defendants. The possibility of reversal "should not deter a
trial judge from undertaking to assist those defendants to make
sure that their innocence or guilt will be based on the merits
and not on their inability to understand legal procedure.,,4 The
clear implication of Redmond is that should a judge stand by
and permit a defendant's ignorance of the law to interfere with
a fair trial, a judgment of conviction will be reversed. (See
also, People v. Marsden, 2 Cal.3d 118,84 Cal. Rtpr. 156,465
Z. People v. Redmond 71 Cal.2d -,
- , 79 Cal. Rptr. 529, 536, 457 P.2d
321,328 (1969).
3. 71 Cal.2d - , - , 79 Cal. Rptr.
529, 536, 457 P.2d 321, 328.
CAL LAW 1970
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P .2d 44 (1970), decided by the Supreme Court after preparation of this article. )
The trial court's inquiries on the subject of competency need
not be prolonged, and a few questions may be enough to indicate the defendant's inability to represent himself. "[T]he
sufficiency of such an inquiry cannot be judged in a vacuum,
without regard to the circumstances of the particular case.,,5
In People v. Daniels, the accused, finding himself unable to
effect a timely substitution of attorneys for his court-appointed
counsel, was denied an alternative request to appear in propria
persona. In his examination on competency, the trial judge
inquired about the defendant's understanding of hearsay testimony, exceptions to the hearsay rule, and peremptory challenges, and then expressed the opinion that since the defendant
was not competent to represent himself a miscarriage of justice
might result if he were permitted to do so. The California
Supreme Court noted that a defendant's ignorance of important rules of procedure or evidence will support an order denying permission to appear in pro per, and noted that a defendant's right to counsel of his choice may not be abused by him
for the purpose of delay. In Daniels, the defendant's request
to represent himself was provoked by the trial court's refusal
to delay proceedings while awaiting the arrival of an attorney
selected by the defendant's father. The Supreme Court emphasized that the right to counsel must be protected against
hasty and improvident waiver.
Yet, the realities of the situation are such that "hasty and
improvident waivers" are frequently accepted where minor
or petty crimes, particularly traffic offenses, are charged. In
In re Johnson, the California Supreme Court recognized that in
traffic cases, the convenience of citizens, as well as the court,
is served by mass arraignments:
The vast majority of citizens haled into court on traffic
violations share the judge's interest in prompt disposition
of their cases, feeling themselves sufficiently inconven-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/21

5. People v. Daniels 71 Cal.2d - ,
- , 80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 911-912, 459
P.2d 225, 239-240 (1969).
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ienced by having to make personal appearances in the
first place. To require the judge to orally examine each
such defendant at length for the purpose of determining
his capability to defend himself would seem to be an idle
and time-wasting ritual. Compliance with the spirit of
the constitutional mandate that an intelligent waiver of
counsel must affirmatively appear on the record may be
officially achieved in such cases in a variety of acceptable
ways.6
But, as noted above, a caveat to the Johnson dictum is that
the "variety of acceptable ways" is reduced by the imposition
of a jail sentence.
In Johnson, the California Supreme Court approved the
procedure followed by the trial court in In re Sheridan, wherein the defendants were informed by the trial court that even if
they expressly waived counsel, "the court will then consider
the nature of the charge, the facts and circumstances of the
case . . . ,[ defendants'] apparent education, experience,
mental competency and conduct to determine whether this is
a proper waiver of [the] right to counsel. If, after consideration of these matters, the court finds [a defendant competent]
. ,it will permit [him] to proceed without counsel."7
The underlying rationale for all trial judges to keep in mind
when ruling on questions relating to the appointment of counsel is well expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Glasser v. U.S.: "The right to have the assistance of counsel
is too fundamental and absolute to allow CO!.lrts to indulge in
nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from
its denial,"8 and, as Justice Stewart asserted in a concurring
opinion in Chapman v. California, "[t]hat, indeed, was the
whole point in Gideon v. Wainwright."9
6. 62 Cal.2d 325, 336, 42 Cal. Rptr.
228, 235, 398 P.2d 420, 427 (1965).
7. 230 Cal. App.2d 365, 369,40 Cal.
Rptr. 894, 895 (1964).

CAL LAW 1970

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970

8.
702,
9.
721,
1083

315 U.S. 60, 76, 86 L.Ed. 680,
62 S.Ct. 457 (1942).
386 U.S. 18, 42, 17 L.Ed.2d 705,
87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065,
(1967).
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F.

Responsibilities of Court-Appointed Counsel

It is well established that court-appointed counsel, just as
an attorney privately retained, has the power to control court
proceedings on behalf of this client. He is an officer of the
court and not a subservient helper of the defendant, and such
an attorney must be permitted to act within the traditional and
statutory status of his office. The California Supreme Court
has repeatedly indorsed the proposition that the constitutional
right to counsel does not include the right to an attorney who
will conduct the defense of a case in accordance with the defendant's whim. A difference of opinion over trial tactics does
not entitle an indigent defendant to new counse1. 10 In People
v. Floyd, the California Supreme Court distinguished People v.
Moss, wherein the Court of Appeals recognized a right to
appointment of new counsel where "a legitimate difference
of opinion develops between a defendant and his court-appointed counsel as to a fundamental trial tactic."ll The Court
declined to rule on this point, since the request for new counsel
in Floyd resulted from lack of confidence in his appointed
counsel and not from a disagreement with trial tactics.
Any attorney who represents a criminal defendant "owes to
his client a duty to investigate carefully crucial defenses of fact
that may be available, [and] the attorney's inexcusable failure
to do so constitutes a denial of effective assistance of counsel
and therefore a fair trial.,,12 Conversely, an attorney has
no duty to offer testimony that is untrue, and counsel who
knowingly offers perjured testimony is subject to criminal
prosecution and disbarment. 13
A public defender who advises a client to enter a plea of

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/21

10. People v. Floyd, 1 Ca1.3d 694, 83
Cal. Rptr. 608, 464 P.2d 64 (1970);
People v. Mattson, 51 Cal.2d 777, 336
P.2d 937 (1959); People v. Nailor, 240
Cal. App.2d 489, 49 Cal. Rptr. 616,
(1967) cert. den., 385 U.S. 1030, 17
L.Ed.2d 678, 87 S.Ct. 763; People v.
Hill, 67 Cal.2d 105, 60 Cal. Rptr. 234,
429 P.2d 586 (1967) cert. den., 389
U.S. 1009, 19 L.Ed.2d 607, 88 S.Ct.
572.
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11. 253 Cal. App.2d 248, 250, 61
Cal. Rptr. 107, 110 (1967).
12. In re Branch, 70 Cal.2d 200, 210,
74 Cal. Rptr. 238, 245, 449 P.2d 174,
181 (1968); People v. Ibarra, 60 Ca1.2d
460, 464, 34 Cal. Rptr.863, 386 P.2d
487, 490 (1963).
13. In re Branch, 70 Cal.2d 200, 74
Cal. Rptr. 238, 449 P.2d 174 (1968).
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guilty to forgery, despite appellate decisions precluding prosecution of credit-card offenses under the general forgery statute, is guilty of inexcusable neglect, and a conviction based on
such a plea cannot stand. "A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is
itself a conviction; nothing more remains but to give judgment
and determine punishment.,,14 By allowing his client to plead
guilty, an attorney does not shift or avoid responsibility for
conscientiously researching the facts and the law. "Deprivation of the right to counsel at the pleading stage because of
incompetence can well constitute a deprivation of due process. ,,16
G. Mental Health Act

The new Mental Health Act (Welfare and Institutions Code
Sections 5000 et seq.) provides inter alia for a 14-day involuntary commitment, if, after examination by the professional
staff of a designated mental health facility, a person is found
as a result of mental disorder, to be dangerous or gravely disabled, and he has been advised of and has refused treatment.
Along with a notice of certification, the person must be informed of his legal right to judicial review by habeas corpus.
He must be provided with an explanation of the meaning of
habeas corpus and of his right to counsel, including court-appointed counsel. To implement these legal requirements, the
Superior Court of San Diego County ordered the designated
mental health facility in that county to admit the staff of a
privately operated legal service for indigent persons to such
facility to advise persons detained there of their legal rights.
The San Diego Court, in its order, appointed the staff of
"Defenders Inc." to visit all such patients, and to advise them
of their rights. It also provided that if the facility did not
comply, the court would automatically issue a writ of habeas
14. In re Williams, 1 Cal.3d 168,
175, 81 Cal. Rptr. 784, 789, 460 P.2d
984, 989 (1969), quoting Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, -, 23 L.Ed.2d
274, 279, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969).
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corpus to require all such persons being treated to be brought
before the court. Representatives of the mental health facility
sought prohibition, which was denied by the California Supreme Court. In upholding the order of the Superior Court,
Justice Burke wrote that the trial court had acted within its
jurisdiction in issuing the order, and he strongly implied that
due process required it or an equivalent procedure:
What is due process depends on circumstances. It varies
with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation.
Its content is a function of many variables, including the
nature of the right affected, the degree of danger caused
by the proscribed condition or activity and the availability of prompt remedial measures. 16
III. Preliminary Hearings.

A. In General
It is a common complaint, despite pronouncements of reviewing courts to the contrary, that preliminary hearings are
highly routine affairs in which the magistrate rubber-stamps
the wishes of the district attorney. From time to time, there
is talk of amending Article 1, Section 8 of the California Constitution to eliminate the necessity for a preliminary hearing
and permit the filing of complaints in the Superior Court in
the same manner as complaints are lodged in the Municipal
Court. The strongest argument in favor of this approach is
that preliminary hearings are extra-baggage, conducted in perfunctory fashion by court and counsel. To the extent that this
argument has validity, it is a product of the misuse or nonuse
of the preliminary hearing to satisfy its two recognized objectives: sifting the evidence and perpetuating testimony, or to
satisfy a third purpose, which is judicially unrecognized,
though important: pretrial discovery.
For those intimately associated with the day-to-day administration of justice, the passage of time has no meaning.
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16. Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.
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With an increasing volume of cases, it makes little difference
to the judge or prosecutor or the busy defense lawyer whether
a case is tried in 30 days, six months, or a year. Matters
are usually forgotten until they appear on the calendar; forgotten, that is, by all except the defendant and his family, and
perhaps the victim.
The preliminary hearing represents a technique whereby a
defendant may, at an early date after the filing of a complaint
against him, have a kind of "mini-trial" that can result in dismissal or, at the very least, provide some insight respecting the
substantiality of the charges, and permit him, if he wishes,
to completely dispose of the matter at an early date by plea.
The California Constitution and Penal Code mandate that the
hearing be held promptly, and, excepting special circumstances
such as physical incapacity of a witness, a prosecutor should
not file unless he is prepared to proceed to a preliminary hearing. Penal Code Section 860, provides that "[t]he magistrate
must, immediately, after the appearance of counsel, or if, after
waiting a reasonable time therefore, none appears, proceed
to examine the case. . . ." It should be noted that it is
the magistrate who is given the power to "examine the case,"
and the sound administration of justice requires that he do so
at the earliest possible date.
One reason for public dissatisfaction with the administration of our criminal laws is the prolonged delay between arrest
and ultimate disposition of the case. A promptly held, properly conducted, preliminary hearing can in many instances serve
as a catalyst for an early and final disposition either by dismissal or plea. The judiciary has an affirmative duty to see
that criminal proceedings are expedited with due regard for
the rights of a defendant to prepare his defense. 17 In this
connection, the magistrate must allow a reasonable time (at
least two days) for a defendant to obtain counselor for assigned counsel to familiarize himself with the case. However,
the indisposition of an essential witness, such as an unconscious victim in a felonious assault case, might require a postponement. Thus, "immediately," as used in Penal Code
17. Penal Code
CAL LAW 1970
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Section 860, means "as soon as practicable," having due regard for the nature and circumstances of the particular case.
In setting a case for preliminary hearing, a court may consider
the time required to subpoena witnesses, the incapacity of witnesses to attend, and the availability of court time.18
There is little justification for protracted delays in the holding of a preliminary hearing because if probable cause is lacking, a defendant should not continue under the shadow of a
criminal charge, and if probable cause is present, both the
public interest and the rights of the defendant require a speedy
trial. Judges and lawyers who are interested in improving
the image of the profession and the courts will see to it that
criminal matters are expeditiously processed without sacrificing any essential right of a defendant. Delay, for the purpose
of obstructing justice, is not a permissible tactic for either the
prosecution or the defense; from the judicial standpoint, it is
intolerable.
B. The Purpose of a Preliminary Hearing

The California Supreme Court has stated that a preliminary
hearing is designed "to weed out groundless or unsupported
charges of grave offenses, and to relieve the accused of the degradation and expense of a criminal trial. Many an unjustifiable prosecution is stopped at that point, where the lack of
probable cause is clearly disclosed."19
In Jennings v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court
held that "to effectuate this constitutional and statutory purpose, the defendant must be permitted, if he chooses, to elicit
testimony or introduce testimony tending to overcome the
prosecution's case or establish an affirmative defense."ao Accordingly, though pretrial discovery is not a recognized purpose of the preliminary hearing, the effect of giving a defend-
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18. People v. Maddox, 67 Cal.2d
647, 63 Cal. Rptr. 371, 433 P2d 163;
Ops. Atty Gen. 62-135, July 12, 1962
(1967).
19. Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal.2d 146,
150, 114 P.2d 335, 338, 135 A.L.R.
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775, 778 (1941); People v. Elliot, 54
Cal.2d 498, 504, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753, 757,
354 P.2d 225, 229 (1960).
20. 66 Cal.2d 867, 880, 59 Cal. Rptr.
440, 449, 428 P.2d 304, 313 (1967).
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ant the right to call witnesses on his own behalf, to cross-examine prosecution witnesses, and to establish an affirmative
defense is to provide a discovery procedure. Although the
reviewing courts will occasionally reject the theory that discovery plays a role in a preliminary hearing, the magistrate
cannot effectively curtail it, providing timely motions are
made in advance of a hearing.l
Often overlooked is the fact that the preliminary hearing is
structured to allow for one of two possible results, a holding or
a dismissal; and it is for the magistrate, not the district attorney, to determine which is appropriate. Therefore, the magisstrate must consider and weigh conflicts in testimony. He
must judge the credibility of witnesses and consider the merits
of an offered defense to determine whether it should operate
to eliminate probable cause that might otherwise be present.
C. Probable Cause

The reviewing Courts have repeatedly held that reasonable
or probable cause means: "Such a state of facts as would lead
a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the
accused. ".8 Later cases have added the word "conscientious"
and have held that the magistrate must "conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the accused's guilt."s The tendency
of some trial courts, however, is to rely on the word "suspicion" and to disregard the qualifying language. The distinction between a "suspicion" and a "strong suspicion" may be a
subtle one, but, nonetheless, it can and must be measured
in order to make the preliminary examination something more
than a formality. If an accused can be committed on mere
suspicion, then the preliminary examination might as well be
1. People v. Superior Court, 264 Cal.
App.2d 694, 699, 70 Cal. Rptr. 480,
483 (1968). "There is no reason . . .
to turn a preliminary examination into
a discovery proceeding where the defendant neither shows that he asked for
statements made by him nor was refused them."
CAL LAW 1970
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dispensed with, since, as Justice Holmes wrote in United States
v. Clark, "[w]hen suspicion is suggested, it is easily entertained."4
In Davis v. Superior Court, the Court of Appeal reviewed
the applicable standard for determining whether there was reasonable or probable cause, and stated that:
The term "probable" has been defined to mean having
more evidence for than against; supported by evidence
which inclines the mind to believe, but leaves some room
for doubt. . . . Such a state of facts as would lead a
man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the
accused. 5
In Garabedian v. Superior Court,6 the California Supreme
Court reviewed the evidence adduced at a preliminary hearing
for felony hit-and-run, and found that proof of mens rea was
lacking:
From the record, it appears that there was no evidence
of an essential element of the crime with which petitioner
was charged, to wit, knowledge on his part that an accident had occurred resulting in injury to another. 7
In Malleck v. Superior Court, the Court of Appeal issued a
writ of prohibition restraining proceedings on an information
charging an assault with a deadly weapon. After reviewing
the preliminary hearing transcript, the Court held that:
From the evidence at the preliminary examination, it is
still as probable that the petitioner did not commit the
crime as that he did. The term "probable" has been
defined as meaning having more evidence for than
against; supported by evidence which inclines the mind
to believe, but leaves some room for doubt. . . . Applying the law to the facts adduced by the preliminary
4. 200 u.s. 601, 609, 50 L.Ed 613,
617, 26 S.Ct. 340 (1906).
s. 175 Cal. App.2d 8, 22, 345 P.2d
513,522 (1959).
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hearing, it is clear that there is no reasonable or probable
cause to believe that the petitioner has committed the
crime charged. Speculation and conjecture would have
to be indulged in to connect the petitioner with the
crime. s

In Murphy v. Superior Court,9 the Court of Appeal reviewed the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing at
which the defendant was charged with assault with intent to
commit murder, and granted a writ of prohibition holding that
after disregarding extrajudicial statements of the accused, it
could not find reasonable or probable cause to hold the defendant to answer. The Court pointed out:
. . . the extra-judicial statements of the accused cannot be considered where there is no showing whatever
that the victim incurred his injury by the act of a criminal
agency sufficient to constitute a prima facie corpus delecti.
. . . As pointed out in People v. Shuber, and as should
have been abundantly evident here, conjecture and surmise alone are no substitutes for competent evidence. 1o
(Emphasis added.)
In Jennings v. Superior Court, the attorney general urged
that the magistrate has only a perfunctory role at a preliminary
hearing and that although cross-examination had been curtailed and the opportunity to establish an affirmative defense
denied, the evidence was nonetheless sufficient for a holding.
The California Supreme Court replied:
In this [contention], the People share a misconception
of the trial court which pervaded the entire proceedings
below, i.e., that as long as the prosecution's evidence
showed probable cause to hold petitioner to answer it
was irrelevant at that stage 'whether the man was, in fact,
framed. . . .' If this view were correct, of course, any
cross-examination or testimony on behalf of the defend8. 142 Cal. App.2d 396, 399, 298
P.2d 115, 117-118 (1956).
9. 188 Cal. App.2d 185, 10 Cal. Rptr.
176 (1961).
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ant would become superfluous. To accept the people's
argument would be in effect to erase sections 865 and
866 from the books and reduce the preliminary hearing to
an ex parte proceeding at which the defendant's presence
would be a meaningless gesture. ll
Much of the confusion over the magistrate's function at a
preliminary hearing arises from the oft-repeated statement that
the prosecution need not produce proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, but must only establish sufficient cause, that is, such
evidence as would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence
to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of
the guilt of the accused. 12 But this does not mean that a
magistrate should conclude the inquiry when the prosecution's proof achieves the level of probable cause. To the contrary, his function at the preliminary hearing is to judge the
credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence:
In conducting a preliminary hearing, the magistrate is
required to pass upon the weight of the evidence and
the credibility of witnesses in determining whether "sufficient cause" has been established. IS
Thus, the rule requiring less evidence at a preliminary hearing than at trial does not suggest that the court should consider
only one side of the case, but rather that if, after weighing the
evidence, the court has probable cause to believe that a felony
has been committed and that the defendant committed it, then
the defendant should be held to answer. Questions of competency, relevancy, and character of the evidence are not
extraneous to a preliminary hearing. 14
Moreover, probable cause must be based on legal and competent evidence, and a magistrate cannot perform his function
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11. Jennings v. Superior Court, 66
Cal.2d 867, 880,59 Cal. Rptr. 440, 448,
428 P.2d 304, 312 (1967).
12. Robison v. Superior Court, 49
Cal.2d 186, 316 P.2d 1 (1957).
13. People v. Akard, 215 Cal. App.2d
182, 185, 30 Cal. Rptr. 69, 70 (1963);
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283, 19 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5, 368 P.2d 529,
533 (1962).

14. In re Schuber, 68 Cal. App.2d
424, 156 P.2d 944 (1945); People v.
Schuber, 71 Cal. App.2d 773, 163 P.2d
498 (1945).
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properly if he permits the record to be cluttered with inadmissible evidence. In order to justify a holding, competent evidence respecting each element of the offense charged must be
produced at the preliminary hearing, and the rule requiring
prima facie evidence of corpus delecti before admitting extrajudicial statements of the accused is applicable at preliminary
hearing as well as at trial. 15

D. Perpetuation of Testimony
It has long been recognized that the testimony of a witness
at a preliminary hearing may, in the event of his unavailability
at time of trial, be offered in evidence at the trial itself. Thus,
counsel, in conducting a cross-examination, must keep in mind
this possibility. Should the magistrate curtail cross-examination, the offer of a preliminary hearing transcript will probably
be denied on Sixth Amendment grounds. In People v. Benjamin,16 the sole witness against a defendant charged with
strong-arm robbery was "unavailable" for trial. A transcript
of this witness' preliminary hearing testimony was admitted
against the defendant at the latter's jury trial, and he was convicted. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, pointing
out that defense counsel at the preliminary hearing was on
notice that the witness might not be available for trial because
of military service in Vietnam, and the defendant had "extensively cross-examined" the witness at the preliminary hearing.17
The reasoning of the Court of Appeal in People v. Benjamin
seems to conflict with both the rationale of the California Supreme Court in People v. Green 18 and considerations of
fundamental fairness. The "unavailable" witness in Benjamin
was the sole identification witness, and there was no corrobora15. People v. Davidson, 227 Cal.
App.2d 331, 38 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1964);
Garabedian v. Superior Court, 59 Cal.
2d 124, 28 Cal. Rptr. 318, 378 P.2d
590 (1963); People v. Allison, 249 Cal.
App.2d 653, 57 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1967);
People v. Beasley, 250 Cal. App.2d 71,
58 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1967).
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tion for his testimony other than the defendant's acknowledgment that he had been at the scene, a diner, at the time of
the alleged robbery. The defendant was arrested approximately 15 minutes later, and none of the stolen property was
found on his person. (See People v. Fortman, 4 Cal. App.3d
495, - Cal. Rptr. - (1970), decided after preparation of
this article, holding that an out-of-state witness subject to
process under the Uniform Act is not "unavailable.")
Barber v. Page,19 emphasizes the defendant's right to crossexamine a witness in the presence of the trier of fact and recognizes the difference, in nature and purpose, between preliminary hearings and trial proceedings, a difference that is
bound to affect the quality of cross-examination. In Green,
the California Supreme Court asserted that:
[E]ven given the opportunity, neither prosecution nor
defense is generally willing or able to fire all its guns
at this early stage of the proceedings (the preliminary
hearing), for considerations both of time and efficacy.
Indeed, it is seldom that either party has had time for investigation to obtain possession of adequate information
to pursue in-depth direct or cross-examination. 20
While "the right to confrontation is basically a trial right, it
includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to view the demeanor of the witness. A
preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because
its function is the more limited one of determining whether
probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial."l The result in Benjamin should, however, serve to remind counsel
of what can happen and that Evidence Code Section 1291
(a)(2) and Penal Code Section 686 permit the use of a preliminary hearing transcript at trial in "unavailability" situations. Thus, the opportunity for cross-examination at the
preliminary hearing may be the final one.
19. 390 U.S. 719, 20 L.Ed.2d 255,
88 S.Ct. 1318 (1968).
20. 70 Cal.2d 654, 663, 75 Cal. Rptr.
782, 788, 451 P.2d 422, 428 (1969).
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IV. Bail
A. In General
It is ironic that the legal profession and legislators are
in the midst of a debate on the subject of "preventive detention," after having so recently become accustomed to the proposition that, whenever possible, defendants should be released without bail and upon their own recognizance. The
policy favoring release is well stated by the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice:
"The law favors the release of defendants pending determination of guilt or innocence. Deprivation of liberty
pending trial is harsh and oppressive in that it subjects
persons whose guilt has not yet been judicially established to economic and psychological hardship, interferes
with their ability to defend themselves and, in many
cases, deprives their families of support. Moreover, the
maintenance of jailed defendants and their families represents major public expense."2
Yet, the advocates of "preventive detention" legislation contend that existing O.R. and bail procedures release into the
community hard-core criminals who will commit other crimes
while awaiting trial on pending charges.
Their argument is bolstered by the fact that there is, in
most jurisdictions, a prolonged delay between arrest and trial,
particularly in those cases in which the defendant is not in
custody. Proposed preventive detention laws commonly authorize confinement of unconvicted persons based upon their
propensity to commit other offenses. Opponents of such legislation assert that defendants are presumed to be innocent
and that the effect of the presumption is destroyed by permitting judges and prosecutors, prior to conviction, to engage
in a hearing calculated to predict whether a defendant, once
released, will commit other crimes. They argue, among other
things, that the art of accurately predicting human behavior
has not been mastered. Moreover, if the defendant is sub2. Standards Relating to Pre-trial
Release, Tentative Draft, Institute of
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sequently acquitted or the charges are dismissed, he will have
been punished unjustly, and, if convicted, he will have been
denied opportunities of participation in his own defense that
are available to other defendants at liberty on bail or on
their own recognizance. 3

B. Release on Bail
In California, pretrial release on bail is governed by the
provisions of Article I, Section 6 of the California Constitution and by several Penal Code sections that implement
the constitutional requirements. 4 Prior to conviction, all persons are entitled to bail as a matter of right,6 unless charged
with a capital offense, in which event, a defendant "cannot be
admitted to bail, when the proof of his guilt is evident or the
presumption thereof great."6 Bail on appeal is discretionary
if the defendant is convicted of a felony,7 but continues as a
matter of right when the appeal is from a judgment imposing
a fine or imprisonment in misdemeanor cases. s During the
period between conviction (that is, a finding of guilt) and
the filing of a notice of appeal, the defendant is subject to
remand at the court's discretion in both felony and misdemeanor cases, and no right to bail exists during that period
of time. 9
In setting bail, the court "shall take into consideration the
seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal
record of the defendant, and the probability of his appearing
at the trial or the hearing of the case. ,,10 Since the sole purpose of bail is to assure the presence of the accused at time
of trial (and not to protect the community from future harm),
California judges must not consider questions beyond those
set forth in Penal Code section 1275. However, the amount
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3. For an excellent discussion of the
subject see Alan Dershowitz, "Preventive Detention," The New York Review, March 13, 1969.
4. See Penal Code §§ 1270-1276.
5. Penal Code § 1271.
6. Penal Code § 1270.
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set after considering such factors is wholly discretionary.
There is no reported decision holding that bail is excessive,
although there are cases sustaining the bail set and holding
that a defendant's inability to post bail is not, in itself, controlling on the issue of excessiveness.ll
Conscientious application of the requirements set forth in
Penal Code section 1275, produce countless situations in
which defendants are financially unable to post bail and thus
must remain in custody. Consequently, some critics have
suggested that our bail system hypocritically permits a form
of "preventive detention," enabling the trial judge to employ
a degree of sophistry in the setting of bail. It must be conceded that there can be found, without difficulty, a plethora
of cases in which the judge must have realized that he had
set bail so high that the defendant would be unable to post
it. Accordingly, the critics argue, let us drop the pose and
adopt "preventive detention" legislation that will enable judges
to do lawfully what they are now doing extra-legally.
The argument is seductive, but probably without merit,
unless inability to post bail is equivalent to unreasonable bail.
For example, a judge arraigning a defendant charged with
armed robbery must, in setting bail, presume the guilt of the
defendant. III Penal Code section 1275 requires that the court
take into consideration "the seriousness of the offense
charged." The charge of armed robbery is serious and the
penalties grave. Secondly, the trial court must consider "the
previous criminal record of the defendant." It is frequently
true that persons charged with a serious offense possess aggravated criminal records. Finally, the trial court must consider "the probability of his appearing at the trial or hearing
of the case," and, here, the judge must balance the defendant's
roots in the community, including his emotional stability,
against the seriousness of the charge and his prior criminal
record. Thus, by adhering to the requirements of Penal Code
section 1275, the trial court may, without regard for the de11. In re Duncan, 54 Cal. 75 (1879);
In re Smiley, 66 Cal.2d 606, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 579, 427 P.2d 179 (1967).
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fendant's potential to commit other crimes, conclude that high
bail is required.
Consequently, many persons charged with serious crimes,
usually crimes of violence, find themselves held on such high
bail that they are unable to post it, and the objectives of
"preventive detention" are attained in a circuitous fashion.
Thus, existing laws are accomplishing, in many of the more
serious cases, what the advocates of "preventive detention"
legislation argue is essential for the protection of the community. Whether the constitutional right to "reasonable
bail" is compromised thereby is a separate question, but there
is no California case that so holds. In any event, the need
for such unique and potentially repressive legislation, even if
constitutional, is not as apparent as the advocates suggest.
Bail is sometimes too high because the magistrate does not
have sufficient facts presented to him at the arraignment to
make an intelligent determination. Although the inability
of a defendant to post the bail set is not a legal basis for
automatic reduction, it represents a relevant factor for a court
to consider on an application to reduce baiJ.13 Similarly, the
court is able to correct any initial misjudgments in the setting
of low bail through its inherent power to increase bail when
circumstances justifying such action are brought to its attention. 14
A 1962 Court of Appeal decision, Evans v. Municipal
Court,15 has been cited for the proposition that "preventive
detention" is approved under California law. 16 Evans should
be limited to its facts; a defendant had been denied bail for
a period of 5t hours after his arrest on a drunk driving charge
because he was too intoxicated during that period to care for
himself or the safety of others. The case stands for the proposition that a defendant need not be released from custody
13. Penal Code § 1289 requires notification to the district attorney in the
event such a motion is made.
14. This may be done without notice
to a defendant. Frankfort v. Superior
Court, 71 Cal. App. 357, 235 P. 60
(1925).
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in an intoxicated condition, and he may be detained "either
for the safety of the individual or for the protection of society.,,17 A statement of the California Supreme Court in 1879
on the subject of bail is nevertheless controlling:
The sole purpose which should guide the Court or judge
in fixing the amount of bail in any case in which bail is
allowed should always be to secure the personal appearance of the accused to answer the charge against him.
It is not the intention of the law to punish an accused
person by imprisoning him in advance of his trial. Such
inhumanity or injustice as inflicting punishment upon
him before his guilt has been ascertained by legal means,
is not to be imputed to the system of law under which
we live, and the provisions found in the American Constitution, establishing the writ of habeas corpus, securing
to accused persons imprisoned for felonies less than capital in degree the absolute right to be admitted to bail,
and declaring that such bail should not be excessive,
strikingly indicate the extreme jealousy with which the
common law guards the personal liberty of the citizen
from unwarrantable or unnecessary restraint. 1s
If bail is used for any other purpose, such as "preventive
detention," it has, in the words of the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, "dubious legality.,,19

C. Release on Own Recognizance (O.R.)
The excellent experience of California courts with O.R.
releases provides some indication of how unwise it would be
to focus on the danger-potentiality of a defendant rather than
upon the likelihood that he will appear for trial. Penal Code
section 1318 authorizes "any court or magistrate who could
release a defendant from custody upon his giving bail" to
17. 207 Cal. App.2d 633, 636, 24
Cal. Rptr. 633, 635 (1962).
18. In re Duncan, 54 Cal. 75, 77
(1879).
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release a defendant upon his own recognizance. The only
consistent opposition to release without bail has come from
the bail bondsmen and their lobbyists. Me anwhjle , those
directly connected with law enforcement and the administration of justice agree that the public interest is best served
when a defendant with roots in the community is permitted
to use his funds to pay legal fees and/or to support his family
rather than to pay a bail bondsman. To set bail where the
court is otherwise reasonably assured that the defendant will
make his appearance is essentially punitive, and provides a
subsidy for an industry that is not subject to the inhibitions
and discipline ordinarily felt by those who participate in the
administration of justice as officers of the court. As the
California Supreme Court has pointed out:
It cannot be argued that release on recognizance lacks
meaningful sanctions: The statute requires the defendant to file an agreement in writing promising to appear
at all times and places ordered and waiving extradition
if he fails to do so and is apprehended outside California
. and makes willful failure to appear punishable
as an independent crime.
. Such an individual
is not free to go where he will but is subject to "restraints
not shared by the public generally.,,20
O.R. procedures authorizing a police officer at his discretion to release an arrested person either by having that person
sign an O.R. agreementl or by issuing a citation accompanied
by defendant's written promise to appear also greatly reduces
the humiliation of the suspect and the cost to the state of
housing him.
Now that our criminal courts have become a clinic for the
cure of most of society's ills, including all types of selfdestructive behavior as well as so-called victimless crimes, we
can no longer distinguish between serious and minor offenses

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/21
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by virtue of their classification as a felony or a misdemeanor.
Numerous misdemeanor cases-battery, resisting arrest, failure to disperse, reckless driving, drunk driving, and sometimes
even disorderly conduct-take on more serious manifestations
vis-a.-vis society than, for example, the ordinary drug possession case. Likewise, many "bad check" cases, including most
forgeries, rate as minor offenses when compared to certain
crimes of violence now classified as misdemeanors.
Thus, the mere labeling of a crime as a felony does not, in
itself, justify the setting of high bail or a denial of an O.R.
release. Countless alleged felony offenders are ex('p' ,cnt candidates for the O.R. program, while some persons charged
with misdemeanors are not. Here again, the prime object of
"preventive detention," keeping dangerous persons off the
street, may be indirectly served by courts giving a literal construction to section 1275, without regard to legislative classification of the offense charged.
D. Conclusion
In light of the broad discretion possessed by California
judges and the reluctance of reviewing courts to tamper with
bail set in the trial courts, it would be shortsighted to undermine existing constitutional requirements by enacting "preventive detention" legislation. 3
Most important, the California experience with O.R. releases is too good to suffer the setback that would result from
unnecessary emphasis on "preventive detention." Serious
offenders are frequently held on high bail anyway, simply by
applying the standards set forth in the Penal Code for the
setting of bail, and those charged with capital offenses are
not entitled to bail. On the other hand, a large percentage
of persons arraigned for the first time are charged with mis3. In an early opinion the Supreme
Court said: "In order to constitute it
'excessive' it must be per se unreasonably great, and clearly disproportionate
to the offense involved, or the peculiar
circumstances appearing must show it
to be so in the particular case." In re
CAL LAW 1970
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demeanor offenses, and of the remaining charged with a
felony, a substantial number will have their charges reduced
to a misdemeanor. A study conducted in San Francisco disclosed that 90 percent of arrested persons are charged with
misdemeanors and, of the remaining 10 percent, 70 percent
have charges either dropped completely or reduced to a misdemeanor. Applying this statistic statewide, it would seem
that well over 90 percent of those who appear before a magistrate are accused misdemeanants, and most of these are
arrested for drunkenness, disturbing the peace, and other petty
offenses.'
A finding of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice is that one out of
every three arrests in the United States is for public drunkenness, and in over 50 percent of all arrests, intoxication is a
major factor.6 Thus, when we talk about dangerous offenders
committing serious crimes while other cases are pending
against them, we are talking about a very small percentage.
It would be a mistake to build into our administration of
justice a mechanism such as "preventive detention," which
must inevitably affect minor as well as major offenders, and
unnecessarily detain persons who represent, if anything, only
a minimal threat to the community.
To the extent that defendants afforded pretrial release are
generating a lack of public confidence in our judicial system
by committing additional offenses before their trial on the
original charge, a cure should be found that is not worse
than the disease. The most obvious solution is to revise our
methods of calendar control and shorten the time between
arrest and trial. In our society, crimes of violence must be
given priority, and we should, in the words of the Presidential
Commission, "provide an accelerated trial process for presumably high-risk defendants."6
4. See 18 Hast, LJ. 643, 652, supra, for data.
5. Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, p. 233.
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This is certainly preferable to the exercise in prophecy
required by the adoption of "preventive detention" legislation. The judicial time and investigative personnel required
to process "preventive detention" hearings would be better
utilized by bringing such defendants to an early trial and,
if convicted, remanding them into custody. In this way, our
judicial system could meet the legitimate criticism that has
brought it into disrepute in recent years, and do so in a
manner that would not prejudice a defendant's right to pretrial release. Effective implementation of the constitutional
requirement of a speedy trial should satisfy the community's
need for protection, and will eliminate the delay that both the
prosecution and the defense so often strive to achieve.
V. The Power of the Court To Dismiss a Criminal Case on Its
Own Motion in Furtherance of Justice
Penal Code section 1385, permits the court "either of its
own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, [to] order an action to
be dismissed." Although the language of the statute is unmistakably clear, it has suffered from judicial atrophy for two
principal reasons: First, trial judges frequently lack sufficient
facts upon which to base a sua sponte order for dismissal,
and, second, when enough facts are available, reviewing
courts, by permitting appeals in the guise of petition for writs
of prohibition, and prosecutors by opposing such dismissals,
have inhibited trial judges from acting on their own motion to
dismiss criminal cases.
In practical application, section 1385 has restored to the
district attorney, de facto, the power of nolle prosequi that
was presumably eliminated when section 1385 was enacted
into law. 7 A prosecutor's motion to dismiss an action in
furtherance of justice on the grounds of "insufficiency of the
evidence," "the unavailability of witnesses," or for a myriad
7. See People v. Superior Court, 69
Cal.2d 491, 72 Cal. Rptr. 330, 446
P.2d 138 (1968).
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of other reasons too numerous to list is usually controlling.
Such a motion is most often made during the calling of a
crowded criminal calendar, and the court routinely acquiesces
without making independent inquiry into the facts. The
procedure virtually eliminates any semblance of the judicial
control and supervision over dismissal of pending criminal
cases that must have been contemplated by the legislature
when the statute was enacted, understandable in view of the
large volume of criminal cases pending in the courts and the
practical consequences of denying such a motion. s
As early as 1887, the California Supreme Court defined
the purpose of section 1385 as follows:
The power under which the order was made is substantially the same as that held by the attorney general in
England, and by the prosecuting officer in many of the
American states, to enter a nolle prosequi. The court,
for the purposes of the order of dismissal, takes charge
of the prosecution, and acts for the people. It holds
the power to dismiss, as the attorney general in England
holds the power to enter a nolle prosequi, by virtue of
the office and the law; and it is exercised upon official
responsibility. The court having acted for the people,
and under express power granted by them to so act in
their criminal prosecutions, there is no appeal on their
part for such action. 9
In reviewing the scope of the common-law power of nolle
prosequi, the California Supreme Court has noted that it "included dismissal of the prosecution entirely or any separable
part thereof," and that such an order could be entered by the
Court on its own motion or that of the district attorney "before
the jury was impanelled, while the case was before the jury,
or after verdict."lo The California Supreme Court has, on
8. See Penal Code § 1386.
9. People v. More, 71 Cal. 546, 547,
12 P. 631, 631-632 (1887).

649, 25 Cal. Rptr. 697, 699, 375 P.2d
641, 643 (1962) app. dismd. 374 US
494, 10 L.Ed.2d 1048, 83 S.Ct. 1912.

10. People v. Sidener, 58 Ca1.2d 645,
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several occasions, asserted that an order of dismissal pursuant
to section 1385 may be entered even after the commencement
of tria1. 11
Penal Code section 1238, defining the people's right of appeal in criminal cases, was recently amended to authorize an
appeal from an order of dismissal under section 1385, whenever such order is based on a defendant's motion to suppress,
from an order of dismissal terminating the action before the
defendant has been placed in jeopardy, or where the defendant has waived jeopardy.12 Such an order is nonappealable
when the dismissal occurs after commencement of trial, and
mandate is also unavailable. 13
In People v. Superior Court, supra, the defendant was
convicted by a jury of armed robbery, whereupon the trial
court, in lieu of granting defendant's motion for new trial,
ordered the action dismissed pursuant to section 1385. The
People petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the Superior Court to vacate its order, and the State Supreme Court
denied the petition, holding, inter alia, that "to permit the
People to resort to an extraordinary writ to review where
there is no right to appeal would be to give the People the
very appeal which the legislature has denied to them.,,14
Noting that the People's right of appeal had been broadened
recently by amendment of Penal Code section 1238, the Court
stated that neither subdivision would have been applicable,
since the order of dismissal was not based on a motion to
11. People v. Alverson, 60 Cal.2d
803, 807, 36 Cal. Rptr. 479, 482, 388
P.2d 711, 714 (1964), "At any time
during the trial, even after the defense
has started;" People v. Polk, 61 Cal.2d
217, 228, 37 Cal. Rptr. 753, 759, 390
P.2d 641, 647 (1964), not subject to the
limitation that the motion must be
made before commencement of the defense; People v. Holbrook, 45 Cal.2d
228, 233, 288 P.2d 1, 3 (1955), dismissal after granting of a motion for
new trial approved.
12. Penal Code § 1238(7)(8).
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14. 69 Cal.2d 491, 499, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 330, 336, 446 P.2d 138, 144
(1968).
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suppress, and because the defendant had been placed in jeopardy and had not waived it. 1s
The Court rejected the attorney general's argument that
section 1385 does not confer power on the Court to dismiss
over objection of the prosecution, and points out that such a
contention "flies in the face of the very language of the section."16 With respect to the power of the Court to dismiss
after a jury verdict of guilty, it was held that "the discretion
of the judge (to dismiss under 1385) is absolute except where
the legislature has specifically curtailed it.,,17
If anything, a court should have broader discretion to
dismiss in furtherance of justice after the verdict than it
should have during trial. After the verdict, the judge
has heard the evidence of the prosecution; whereas prior
to the conclusion of the trial there is always the possibility that in the absence of dismissal more evidence
may be received. IS
Finally, the high Court revealed its own philosophy respecting
court-ordered dismissals and declined to restrict trial judges
to cases in which the evidence was insufficient as a matter
of law:
If a trial judge is convinced that the only purpose to be
served by a trial or a retrial is harrassment of the defendant, he should be permitted to dismiss, notwithstanding the fact that there is sufficient evidence of guilt,
however weak, to sustain a conviction on appeal. The
trial judge who has heard the evidence as in the instant
case is in an excellent position to determine whether
a retrial would further the interest of justice. The legislature has given the trial court the power to dismiss
under the broad standard of justice, and in view of the
high caliber of our trial judges and their responsibility
to the electorate, we believe that recognition of such
15. 69 Cal.2d 491, 498, 72 Cal. Rptr.
330, 335, 446 P.2d 138, 143 Fn. 5.
16. 69 Cal.2d 491, 501, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 330, 337, 446 P.2d 138, 145.
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69 Ca1.2d 491, 503, 72 Cal.
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power in cases of conflicting evidence will not result in
abuse but, to the contrary, believe that the due exercise
of the power to dismiss in proper cases of conflicting
evidence will further justice. l9
Appropriate considerations for the trial court in determining whether to, on its own motion, order a dismissal pursuant
to section 1385 after a guilty verdict are: a weighing of the
evidence; the nature of the crime involved; the fact that the
defendant has or has not been incarcerated while awaiting
trial; the length of such incarceration; the possible harrassmerit and burdens imposed on the defendant by a retrial;
and the likelihood, if any, that additional evidence will be
presented on a retrial. "When the balance falls clearly in
favor of the defendant, a trial court not only may but should
exercise the powers granted to him by the legislature and
grant a dismissal in the interest of justice."ao

VI. Reasonable Doubt
The concept of "reasonable doubt" in a criminal case is
an elusive one, difficult to define in meaningful terms or to
distinguish from the "preponderance of evidence" rule applicable in civil cases. Mr. Justice Black has written that
the term "reasonable" is "that irrepressible, vague and delusive standard which at times threatens to engulf the entire
law, including the Constitution itself, in a sea of judicial discretion."l It is paradoxical that our jurisprudence has seized
upon "reasonable doubt" as the concept most likely to assure
near certainty in the fixing of criminal responsibility.
Jury arguments on the subject are often futile, particularly
since the Court's charge is rendered relatively inflexible by
virtue of the provisions of Penal Code sections 1096 and
1096a. In 1964, this writer observed, in an article prepared
for the Continuing Education of the Bar, that "whether the
'reasonable doubt' requirement affords a criminal accused a
19.
Rptr.
20.
Rptr.

69 Cal.2d 491, 504, 72 Cal.
330, 339, 446 P.2d 138, 147.
69 Cal.2d 491, 505, 72 Cal.
330, 340, 446 P.2d 138, 148.
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real advantage over a defendant in a civil case is an enigma.
It is a mistake, indeed, for the defense lawyer in a criminal
case to assume that it does."2 Since writing that article, six
years have passed, almost five of which have been spent on
the bench, but the enigma remains, and I question whether
judges in their jury instructions or counsel during final argument meaningfully communicate to jurors the essence of the
reasonable doubt requirement.
Conversations with jurors suggest to me that many analyze
the evidence and reach conclusions based on what amounts
to a preponderance of the evidence and are satisfied to resolve
evidentiary conflicts by asking whether there is more evidence
for than against the proposition that a defendant is guilty.
The "reasonable doubt" instructions most often resorted to
by California judges create the visual impression of a slight
"tilting of the scales," one way or the other.
The distinction between the two burden-of-proof requirements can be clarified by an instruction that is given by some
California judges, which expressly tells the jury that a preponderance of the evidence is insufficient to justify a conviction:
The rule of law in civil cases is different than the rule in
criminal cases in this: In civil actions a jury may be
authorized to find a verdict in accordance with a mere
preponderance of the evidence but such is not the law
in criminal cases. A bare preponderance of the evidence
against the defendant which does not eliminate reasonable doubt is not sufficient to warrant his conviction but
on the trial of this and all criminal cases the guilt of the
defendant must be established to the satisfaction of the
jury to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt
or he should be acquitted. s
The shortcoming of this instruction is that much remains for
the imagination, and, while implying that something more
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than "a tipping of the scales" is required, it does not define
that "something more" in quantitative terms that are useful
to a jury in applying the definition of reasonable doubt set
forth in Penal Code section 1096.
The Third Circuit recently touched on the essential difference between the "preponderance of evidence" rule and the
"reasonable doubt" requirement by pointing out that finding a
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt envisions a subjective standard. 4 While the key to implementation of the
preponderance of evidence rule is a mere weighing of the
evidence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral
certainty requires not only a weighing of the evidence, but
an abiding
also employment of a value system [".
conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge"5].
Thus, the significance of the reasonable doubt requirement
to individual jurors and judges must necessarily depend on
experience factors as related to and integrated with the ethical
concepts of the individual trier of fact.
Accordingly, opposite results-on the same facts-are possible, depending on the kind of jury selected or the personality and philosophy of the trial judge. "Reasonable doubt"
is premised upon the proposition that evidence may preponderate in favor of guilt and yet be insufficient to compel a
conviction. Although a weighing of the evidence may demonstrate the probability that a defendant is guilty, a juror, heeding the implications of moral certainty, might well have doubts
that are founded upon reason.
Even experienced appellate judges find the distinction a
difficult one to make:
When preponderance of the evidence of guilt is
conceded, it seems to us difficult to say that the proof
nonetheless falls short of the faint, fine and wavy line
on one side of which the proof is beyond a reasonable
doubt and to a moral certainty.s
4. U.s. v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407
(1969) cert. den.
S. See Penal Code § 1096.
6. People v. Superior Court, 257
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Yet, the difference is distinct, and the "faint, fine and wavy
line" results from a legitimate effort to define "reasonable
doubt" in such a way as to preclude jurors from believing it
to be an insurmountable obstacle to conviction.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires "moral certainity," and one acts "morally" when he conducts himself rightly
or virtuously. When the word "moral" is used as an adjective
to define a mental state such as "certainty," it suggests that
there are ethical considerations implicit in a state of moral
certainty. Thus, to be morally certain of something, one
must have excluded all reasonable possibility of error. But,
we do not instruct a jury in such terms. Instead, we say:
The law does not require demonstration or that degree
of proof which, excluding all possibility of error, produces absolute certainty, for such degree of proof is
rarely possible. Moral certainty only is required, which
is that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. 7
Why is it that we do not tell a jury affirmatively that to be
morally certain it must exclude all reasonable possibility of
error, rather than employ a semantic trick that states negatively the most positive aspect of our criminal justice system
and qualifies "reasonable doubt" to a point that makes it
nearly indistinguishable from the "preponderance of evidence" rule? Since Penal Code section 1096 (set fo~h in
CALJIC 21 (Rev.)) provides that reasonable doubt "is not a
mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human
affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt," it is unnecessary to instruct
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the U. S. Supreme Court rejects the
suggestion of the New York Court of
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preparation of this article the third
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Although CALJIC 21 revised is set
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Junes that "moral certainty only is required"s (emphasis
added) unless our purpose is to dilute the impact and reduce
the sobering effect that the "reasonable doubt" instruction was
calculated to have on persons-be they judge or jury-entrusted with the life, liberty, and reputation of individuals
accused of crime.
It is this observer's view that CALJIC 22 (Rev.), which
purports to elaborate upon Penal Code section 1096, does the
very thing that the "note" in CALJIC claims it does not do.
That is, it curtails the quantum of proof required by Penal
Code section 1096. Moreover, it undermines the ethical basis
on which the term "moral certainty" is founded. Coming as
it does on the heels of a statement that reasonable doubt is
not an "imaginary doubt," CALJIC 22 implies, in rather
strong terms, that the reasonable doubt requirement is not
the high hurdle or "heavy burden" that our system of criminal
justice intends it to be. Although a similar argument was
made in People v. Kennelly,9 it was rejected by the Court of
Appeals. Nevertheless, it does not appear that the Court
considered the psychological impact of such qualifying language upon a lay jury. (See footnote 7, supra.)
The California Supreme Court has equated "moral certainty" with a "near certainty,"lO and has employed this quantitative standard to review convictions wherein it was
contended on appeal that the evidence was insufficient as a
matter of law. In People v. Redmond,!l the Supreme Court
reversed a conviction based on the "identification" testimony
of a victim who said only that the defendant's voice resembled
her assailant's voice and that the expression in his eyes was
similar. "Evidence," said the Court, "which merely raises a
strong suspicion of the defendant's guilt is not sufficient to
support a conviction. Suspicion is not evidence; it merely
raises a possibility, and this is not a sufficient basis for an
8. CADIC 22 (Rev.), dropped in
CALJIC 3rd edition.

41 Cal. Rptr. 284, 396 P.2d 700
(1964).

9. People v. Kennelly, 166 Cal.
App.2d 261, 332 P.2d 733 (1958).
10. People v. Hall, 62 Cal.2d 104,

11. People v. Redmond, 71 Cal.2d
- , 79 Cal. Rptr. 529, 457 P.2d 321
(1969).
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inference of fact. "12 Reaffirming principles announced earlier
in People v. Bassett/ 3 the Court stated that in a criminal case,
"the prosecution's burden is a heavy one; to justify a criminal
conviction, the trier of fact must be reasonably persuaded to
a near certainty. The trier must, therefore, have reasonably
rejected all that undermines confidence.,,14
(Emphasis
added. ) In reviewing the trial record Redmond, the Supreme Court gave credit only to "substantial" evidence, that
is, evidence reasonably inspiring confidence and of solid
value. In People v. Bassett,IS the Supreme Court catalogued
cases in which the "substantial evidence" test had been applied
by reviewing courts to justify reversal based on legally insufficient evidence. A reading of these cases and the reviewing
courts' explanation for reversal provides a useful exercise for
those seeking to appreciate the distinction between the reasonable doubt and preponderance of the evidence rules. I6
The potentially misleading effect of CALJIC 22 (Rev.) on
jurors suggests that reevaluation is required. Future revisions
should substantially incorporate the language of the California Supreme Court in Bassett. Phrases such as "near certainty" and emphasis on the necessity for rejecting "all that undermines confidence" more nearly comport with our claim that
the state assumes a "heavy burden" when it undertakes the
prosecution of one of its citizens. (See footnote 7, supra).
Although miscarriages of justice can result from even the
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12. 71 Cal.2d - , - , 79 Cal. Rptr.
529, 534, 457 P.2d 321, 326.
13. 69 Cal.2d 122, 139, 70 Cal. Rptr.
193, 204, 443 P.2d 777, 788 (1968).
14. 71 Cal.2d - , - , 79 Cal. Rptr.
529, 534-535, 457 P.2d 321, 326-327
(1969).
15. 69 Cal.2d 122, 70 Cal. Rptr.
193, 443 P.2d 777 (1968).
16. See in addition to Redmond, 71
Cal.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 529, 457 P.2d
321 (1969) and Bassett, 69 Cal.2d 122,
70 Cal. Rptr. 193, 443 P.2d 777
(1968), People v. Hall, 62 Cal.2d 104,
41 Cal. Rptr. 284, 396 P.2d 700
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(1964); People v. Gould, 54 Cal.2d 621,
7 Cal. Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d865
(1960); People v. Jackson, 238 Cal.
App.2d 477, 47 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1965);
People v. Singh, 11 Cal. App.2d 24, 53
P.2d 403 (1936); People v. Jackson, 44
Cal.2d 511, 282 P.2d 898 (1955); People v. Rodriquez, 186 Cal. App.2d 433,
8 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960); People v.
Tatge, 219 Cal. App.2d 430, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 323 (1963); People v. Tidmore,
218 Cal. App.2d 716, 32 Cal. Rptr.
444 (1963); People v. Ravel, 122 Cal.
App.2d 312, 264 P.2d 610 (1953);
People v. Alkow, 97 Cal. App.2d 797,
218 P.2d 607 (1950).
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most scrupulous adherence to the burden of proof requirement, "reasonable doubt" remains the doctrine that, more
than any other, assures that innocent persons will not be
wrongly convicted. I7
17. The United States Supreme
Court, in a decision handed down this
term, has held that due process of law
requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, in that the delinquency of a
juvenile must be ascertained according
to this standard, not by the preponderance of evidence rule. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, says the Court, is
"basic in our law and rightly one of
the boasts of a free society." Its purpose is "to safeguard men from dubious
and unjust convictions" and "recognizes
the fundamental principles that are
deemed essential for the protection of
life and liberty. The reasonable doubt
standard plays a vital role in the
American system of criminal procedure.

It is a prime instrument for reducing the
risk of conviction resting on factual error. . . . The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of
innocence-that bedrock, axiomatic and
elementary principle whose enforcement
lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.
Due process requires that no man shall
lose his liberty unless the government
has borne the burden of . . . (proving his guilt and) therefore to this end
the reasonable doubt standard is indispensable for it impresses on the trier of
fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude on the facts in
issue." In re Winship, supra, 25 L. Ed.
2d 368, 374-375.

*

CAL. LAW 1970

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970

65i

43

